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Moral Generalism: Enjoy in Moderation*
Pekka Va¨yrynen
I. INTRODUCTION
One important strand in moral particularism concerns moral practice.
Moral reasoning, it maintains, ought not to rely on moral principles
because such reliance distorts moral judgment and so provides poor
moral guidance. Another important strand concerns the structure of
the moral domain. The traditional generalist conception of moral theory
goes wrong, particularists maintain, in seeing moral theorizing as a proj-
ect of articulating and defending substantive principles concerning the
rightness and wrongness of actions, the value of states of affairs, the
fairness of social arrangements, and so on. Depending on which par-
ticularist you talk to, this is either because there are no true moral
principles, or because there is no good reason to think there are any,
or because, even if there are true moral principles, actions and other
objects of moral assessment don’t depend for their moral status on there
being any.1 In this article I challenge the second strand in particularism
* Many thanks to Terence Irwin, Nicholas Sturgeon, Zolta´n Gendler Szabo´, and Jennifer
Whiting for comments on very early versions of this article, Jonathan Dancy for a very helpful
conversation in Amsterdam in July 2001, and Mark Reiff for comments on a more recent
draft. Especially warm thanks to Michael Ridge for volumes of stimulating correspondence
and Connie Rosati for a battery of helpful suggestions. Many thanks also to three anonymous
referees, Mark Lance as one of the referees for Ethics, and the editors of Ethics.
1. For discussions that focus primarily on the second strand in particularism, see
Jonathan Dancy, Moral Reasons (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), 60–108, “The Particularist’s
Progress,” in Moral Particularism, ed. Brad Hooker and Margaret Little (Oxford: Clar-
endon, 2000), 130–56, and Ethics without Principles (Oxford: Clarendon, 2004); Russ
Shafer-Landau, “Moral Rules,” Ethics 107 (1997): 584–611; Roger Crisp, “Particularizing
Particularism,” in Hooker and Little, Moral Particularism, 23–47, 32–42; T. H. Irwin,
“Ethics as an Inexact Science: Aristotle’s Ambitions for Moral Theory,” in Hooker and
Little, Moral Particularism, 100–129; Frank Jackson, Philip Pettit, and Michael Smith,
“Ethical Particularism and Patterns,” in Hooker and Little, Moral Particularism, 79–99;
Margaret Olivia Little, “Moral Generalities Revisited,” in Hooker and Little, Moral Par-
ticularism, 276–304; David McNaughton and Piers Rawling, “Unprincipled Ethics,” in
Hooker and Little, Moral Particularism, 256–75; Richard Holton, “Principles and Partic-
ularisms,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, suppl., 76 (2002): 191–209; Robert Audi,
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by defending a novel generalist account of the structure of the moral
domain which is able to accommodate much of what is dear to partic-
ularists short of their particularism. The viability of particularist accounts
of moral guidance I leave for another occasion.2
In the most sustained defense of particularism so far, Jonathan
Dancy defines particularism as the negation of the generalist view that
“the very possibility of moral thought and judgement depends on the
provision of a suitable supply of moral principles.”3 This naturally sug-
gests that generalism and particularism are views in moral psychology
about the relation between moral thought and moral principles, ge-
neralism holding that no one would be capable of making moral judg-
ments unless they (or someone) had some appropriate moral principles.
But Dancy also casts the debate in metaphysical terms with no psycho-
logical overtones, as when he writes that “particularism is a view in moral
metaphysics . . . about the ways in which actions get to be right and
wrong,” which involves denying that the way moral reasons behave de-
pends in any way on “the sorts of general truths about how reasons
behave that might be expressed by moral principles.”4 The form of
generalism I defend here is a metaphysical view concerning particular
moral facts or truths.5 Notice that generalism in moral metaphysics car-
ries no commitment to the claim that people can make particular moral
judgments in the first place only by basing them on moral principles.6
The Good in the Right (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004), 70–73; Sean
McKeever and Michael Ridge, “What Does Holism Have to Do with Particularism?” Ratio
18 (2005): 93–103; and Mark Lance and Margaret Olivia Little, “Defending Moral Par-
ticularism,” in Contemporary Debates in Moral Theory, ed. James Dreier (Oxford: Blackwell,
2006), 305–21. For discussions that focus primarily on the first strand in particularism,
see David McNaughton, Moral Vision (Oxford: Blackwell, 1988), 190–93; Joseph Raz,
“The Truth in Particularism,” in his Engaging Reason (New York: Oxford University Press,
1999), 218–46; Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, “Varieties of Particularism,” Metaphilosophy 30
(1999): 1–12, 9–11; and Crisp, “Particularizing Particularism,” 25–32. Formulations of
the two strands vary from particularist to particularist and suggest various substrands.
For a helpful discussion of the various possibilities, see Sean McKeever and Michael
Ridge, Principled Ethics: Generalism as a Regulative Ideal (Oxford: Clarendon, 2006), 3–21.
The term ‘particularism’ can also be used as a label for a plethora of other kinds of
views that I ignore here. See Audi, The Good in the Right, 69–70.
2. I defend a generalist account of moral guidance against the first strand in partic-
ularism in my “Usable Moral Principles,” in Challenging Moral Particularism, ed. Mark Lance,
Matjaz Potrc, and Vojko Strahovnik (London: Routledge, forthcoming).
3. Dancy, Ethics without Principles, 7.
4. Ibid., 140 and 7–8, respectively.
5. For my present purposes, the language of moral properties, facts, and truths may
be construed minimalistically.
6. For empirical objections to this claim, see Gerald Dworkin, “Unprincipled Ethics,”
in Moral Concepts, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, ed. Peter French, Theodore Uehling,
and Howard Wettstein, vol. 20 (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1995),
224–39.
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If some people were bad at thinking in terms of moral principles, this
would do nothing to undermine the metaphysical claim that particular
moral facts or truths depend on the existence of true moral principles.
Of course, we can state generalism in moral metaphysics in a way
that is continuous with Dancy’s statement, as the view that the possibility
of sound moral judgment depends on the existence of a suitable (or,
perhaps better, comprehensive) set of true moral principles. By “sound
moral judgment” I mean correct judgment of moral fact in general, but
in this article I largely focus, as particularists do, on moral facts about
reasons for and against actions and attitudes, for right and wrong ac-
tions’ being right and wrong, and so on. I take a set S of true moral
principles to be “comprehensive” if, for any moral truth M, a principle
or a set of principles in S is required for M to hold.7 To illustrate, suppose
I ought to repay my debt to David. If the above sufficient condition is
met, my having a moral reason to repay my debt requires that there be
some true moral principle (presumably one that somehow has to do
with repaying one’s debts). If generalism is true, there is a comprehen-
sive set of principles that “cover the ground” in this sense.8
Generalism so understood rules out any form of particularism in
moral metaphysics. Notice, in particular, that it rules out even the weak-
est form of particularism, which allows for the existence of true moral
principles and merely denies that moral reasons in any way depend on
this.9 That view is still a form of particularism: merely there being true
moral principles to which sound moral judgments conform doesn’t show
that those principles are required for the objects of those judgments
(moral reasons, duties, and so on) to be in place. Without further ar-
gument to the contrary, we wouldn’t seem to have much of a reason to
suppose that morality has any real need for true moral principles, even
if some exist.
In what follows, I supply such an argument, using particularism as
7. This sufficient condition concerns moral metaphysics. A more demanding gen-
eralist strategy would be to argue that knowledge of particular moral truths presupposes
the availability of true moral principles. See McKeever and Ridge, Principled Ethics, 113–21.
8. See Dancy, Ethics without Principles, 82. If merely some sufficiently high proportion
of moral reasons depended on the existence of true moral principles, this might seem to
support some hybrid of generalism and particularism; it would seem like a wrong sort of
criterion for generalism. Dancy would, however, recommend the particularist conclusion
that although some moral reasons can be captured in true principles, their status as reasons
in no way depends on this (ibid., 81). He seems to think that there would be little reason
to suppose that some moral reasons depend on the existence of true moral principles if
not all reasons did so, and there seems to be something right about this. If so, a hybrid
view lacks motivation. Given this dialectic, if one can show (as I aim to do) that some
moral reasons genuinely require the existence of true moral principles, that should give
us some reason to suppose that all do.
9. See Dancy, Ethics without Principles, 81–84.
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a foil for developing a novel, moderate form of generalism. Section II
discusses “the holism of reasons,” which most particularists present as
the main support for particularism. Put bluntly, my strategy is to hijack
holism into a generalist framework. Section III presents a positive ar-
gument for generalism that appeals to a novel account of moral prin-
ciples as a kind of “hedged” principles. This account offers an alternative
explanation of holism and so undercuts much of the motivation for
particularism but supports generalism. Section IV defends moderate
generalism against objections. Section V exploits the resources of the
view to defeat three arguments from holism to particularism.
II. HOLISM ABOUT REASONS
Particularists typically present the holism of reasons as an especially
powerful way of defending particularism. Jonathan Dancy, for example,
writes that “if there is a holism of reasons . . . the prospects for sub-
stantial moral principles look bleak.”10 Holism is a doctrine about nor-
mative reasons in general. A normative reason is often characterized as
a consideration that “favors” the belief, attitude, or action for which it
is a reason (where ‘consideration’ stands for the kind of thing that can
be a reason and the talk of favoring is meant to paraphrase rather than
analyze the talk of reasons).11 A reason may be “contributory” rather
than “decisive.” For a consideration to be a contributory reason for an
action is for it to favor the action without necessarily determining what
one ought to do overall. Further considerations may strengthen the
overall case for the action, either by intensifying the reason or giving
other reasons for the action. Opposing reasons don’t necessarily destroy
a contributory reason for an action, but they may make the overall case
against the action stronger than the overall case in its favor. What one
ought to do overall is often said to be determined by the “balance” of
contributory reasons.12
I begin by stating reasons holism and explaining its putative con-
10. Dancy, Moral Reasons, 66. See also Dancy, “Particularist’s Progress,” 135; and Little,
“Moral Generalities Revisited,” 279, 284.
11. See T. M. Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1998), 17; and Dancy, Ethics without Principles, 29. Most writers treat considerations
as something like facts or true propositions, and in my view sensibly so.
12. These prefatory remarks aren’t meant to take a stand on issues about just how
various factors combine to determine what one ought to do overall. For example, I take
no stand on whether “the presence of one feature can affect the weight of another”
(Dancy, Ethics without Principles, 105), or on whether reasons (once their weights are de-
termined) determine what one ought to do overall by combining in some additive way,
or on how the balancing metaphor is to be cashed out. I can afford silence on this front
because the arguments to come move primarily at the contributory level. For a prominent
discussion of some of these complications, see Shelly Kagan, “The Additive Fallacy,” Ethics
99 (1988): 5–31.
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nection to particularism. Since I discuss arguments from holism to par-
ticularism in detail only after offering my own positive view, a word
about my general strategy is in order. There are two ways to resist ar-
guments from holism to particularism. One is to argue against holism.
The other is to argue that holism, even if true, fails to support partic-
ularism. While many generalists follow the first strategy, my own strategy
is the second. It doesn’t therefore matter for my present purposes
whether holism is true or not, and so in what follows I can simply grant
to holists certain claims which would require extensive discussion if I
were arguing for or against holism.
A. What Is Reasons Holism?
Reasons holism treats normative reasons as irreducibly context depen-
dent in a certain way. Dancy defines holism as the view that “a feature
that is a reason in one case may be no reason at all, or an opposite
reason, in another.”13 Holism is typically illustrated by “valence switch”
examples. That I borrowed a book from you can be a reason for me to
return it but is no reason at all to do so if you stole the book from the
library. That something would bring me pleasure is in many contexts a
reason for doing it, but it may be no reason at all, or even a reason
against the act, in certain other contexts, such as when the pleasure
would be sadistic.14 (Valence switches therefore come in two varieties:
neutralization and reversal.) According to holism, so defined, any reason
is potentially open to a valence switch. The intended contrast is with
“reasons atomism,” the view that “a feature that is a reason in one case
must remain a reason, and retain the same polarity, in any other”; rea-
sons are invariable in that their polarity cannot vary across contexts.15
Unfortunately, atomism so defined rules out the view that some
reasons are variable but depend for their status as reasons on invariable
reasons.16 Since such a view preserves the spirit of atomism, atomism is
better defined as the view that all reasons are invariable in an extended
sense: either they are invariable or, if they are variable, they depend for
whatever valence they have on invariable reasons. Even with this re-
13. Dancy, Ethics without Principles, 7. I think he means ‘feature’ to be an umbrella
term for properties and relations and for various entities in which these can figure, such
as aspects of situations, events, and states of affairs.
14. See Dancy, Moral Reasons, 60–61. Like examples are ubiquitous in the literature.
15. Dancy, Ethics without Principles, 7.
16. The distinction between dependent and nondependent, or “derivative” and “ba-
sic,” reasons is complicated in ways that I cannot discuss here but require care in applying
the distinction. For example, it is unclear when we have two reasons for action such that
one depends on the other, rather than one fact that is a reason for action and another
fact that realizes the fact that is the reason and/or is a reason to believe that that fact is
a reason.
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finement, however, room still remains for the hybrid view that some but
not all reasons are invariable in this extended sense.
Remember, though, that holism is meant to be a view about nor-
mative reasons in general. We do better to define holism as the view
that all reasons are variable qua reasons, in the sense that no necessary
connection exists between the property of being a reason of a certain
kind and the property of always being the same kind of reason.17 We
can then define atomism as the view that a necessary connection be-
tween being a reason and always being the same kind of reason does
exist: any reason must, qua a reason, always either be the same kind of
reason or depend for its being the reason it is on a reason that always
is the same kind of reason.18
Holism and atomism so defined both allow for both variable and
invariable reasons. Atomism allows for variable reasons so long as they
depend on invariable reasons. Holism allows not merely for contingently
invariant reasons but also for invariable reasons, since just because a
consideration may vary qua a reason doesn’t mean that it does or must.
It allows, for example, the possibility that things like cruelty or inflicting
pain or distress on unwilling victims just for one’s own enjoyment count
against an action in any world, so long as they are invariable reasons
not because they are reasons but because of some such thing as their
particular contents.19 So explained, invariable reasons pose no threat to
the claim that no reason, just in virtue of being a reason, is necessarily
immune to valence switches. Holists who grant the possibility of invar-
17. Dancy adds the qualification “qua a reason” to holism in recent work. See Dancy,
Ethics without Principles, 77. The definition in the text suggests that holism, by itself, doesn’t
purport to give an analysis or full account of the property of being a reason (or what
something’s having that property consists in), but merely to constrain such accounts in
certain ways. Some think that no such analysis is available because reasons are the basic
normative units that determine all other normative properties and/or because the favoring
relation admits no further analysis (compare n. 37 below). But these claims don’t follow
from holism alone.
18. The revised definitions are mutually exclusive but still not exhaustive. They still
leave room for a hybrid view which posits one property of being a reason which is nec-
essarily connected to the property of always being the same kind of reason and another
which isn’t. But even apart from considerations of theoretical unity, there are good reasons
to avoid positing two fundamentally different reason relations in this way. The principal
motivation to have reasons differ in their nature as reasons in this kind of fundamental
way would be to save the claim that some reasons are invariable (in the above extended
sense) even if others aren’t. But we can capture this possibility without accepting the
hybrid view (see below).
19. Compare Dancy, “Particularist’s Progress,” 136–37, and Ethics without Principles,
77. This account has initial plausibility: if being a reason is an extrinsic property of con-
siderations (as the cases of instrumental and variable reasons would seem to suggest), it
would seem preferable to explain the invariability of whatever invariable reasons there
may be by reference to their particular contents (or other necessary or intrinsic properties).
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iable reasons can still consistently deny any necessary connection be-
tween being a reason of a certain type and being an invariable reason.
B. Why Bother with Holism?
Our revised definition of atomism neutralizes examples of variable rea-
sons that are typically used to illustrate holism. Valence switch examples
won’t by themselves show that no such necessary connection exists as
atomism posits between the properties of being a reason and being an
invariable reason. For all that those examples show, there might be
either an invariable reason, on which the variable reason depends, or
an invariable reason of which the variable feature is only a part.20
Holism can be defended on more theoretical grounds, however.
One argument is that holism is better equipped than atomism to provide
a unified view of the nature of normative reasons which covers theo-
retical, prudential, instrumental, moral, and aesthetic reasons, on the
grounds that some of these reasons are clearly holistic.21 Another is that
holism fits with certain intuitive distinctions better than atomism does.22
Whether these arguments establish holism doesn’t, again, matter for my
purposes. But, to motivate my argument strategy, I should explain why
holism might seem intuitive enough to be worth accommodating in a
generalist framework.
Consider the case of “The Promise”:23
(1) S promised to f.
(2) S’s promise to f wasn’t extracted by fraud or manipulation.
(3) S wasn’t literally insane when she promised to f.
(4) f-ing isn’t itself immoral.
(5) So, there is a (moral) reason for S to f.
I take it as an assumption of the example that each of 1–4 is relevant
to whether 5 holds. If 5 holds, then there should be something that is
a reason which favors S’s f-ing. Some would regard 1 as that something.
It seems at least plausible that S would have had no reason at all to
keep her promise had it been extracted by fraud or manipulation, or
20. For the first reply, see Crisp, “Particularizing Particularism,” 37; and McNaughton
and Rawling, “Unprincipled Ethics,” 266–67. For the second, see Raz, “Truth in Particu-
larism,” 228 n. 22, 236; and Brad Hooker, “Dancy on How Reasons Are Related to Oughts,”
Southern Journal of Philosophy, suppl., 41 (2003): 114–20, 119. These replies are purely
defensive: they give no positive reason to think that there must be invariable reasons
behind any variable reason, but only that there might be.
21. See Dancy, Ethics without Principles, 74–77.
22. Ibid., 38–45.
23. I adapt this case from Dancy (ibid., 38). Using natural variants of the case would
affect nothing of substance in what follows. As is customary, I will simplify by referring to
the propositions 1, 2, etc., when I mean the facts they state.
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given while literally insane. But if 1 is a reason in this context, but no
reason at all in the absence of 2 or 3, then 1 is a variable reason.24
Atomists typically respond to claims like this by expanding the content
of reasons: the reason to f is a complex fact, which has as its parts 1–3
plus whatever else is required to make it invariable.25 Holists argue that
this response leads to counterintuitive claims about the content of nor-
mative reasons.
The first step in the argument distinguishes between a feature of
a situation that plays a certain role and a feature whose presence (or
absence) is required for the first feature to play its role but which doesn’t
itself play that role. To illustrate, consider the distinction between a
cause of an effect and that without which the cause wouldn’t be a cause
of that effect. We think that what makes plants grow is their having
adequate nutrition, water, and light, and that these things make plants
grow only in the absence of pests, frost, natural disasters, and the like,
but that the absence of the latter isn’t part of what makes plants grow.
The next step observes that atomism rejects the application of this
general distinction to reasons. According to atomism, something can
be part of a reason which favors the action it is a reason for only by
being part of an invariable reason or, in the derivative case of variable
reasons, by depending on an invariable reason. So if atomism were right,
there would seemingly have to be no features whose presence (or ab-
sence) is required for something to be part of a reason which favors
the action it is a reason for but which aren’t themselves parts of the
reason in question.
The last step says that not all conditions relevant to whether some-
thing is a reason of a certain type need be relevant by being parts of
the reason.26 That I wouldn’t have had a reason to return to you the
book you lent me had you stolen it doesn’t mean that the absence of
this and other defeaters is itself part of the reason why I should return
it. Regarding “The Promise,” the claim that 3 is necessary in order for
24. Holism allows that reasons can be complex facts. Owing to the relevance of 3,
we get a variable reason even if we think that the reason which favors S’s f-ing isn’t that
S promised to f but that S freely promised—i.e., something like the combination of 1
and 2. See Dancy, Ethics without Principles, 39.
25. See Raz, “Truth in Particularism,” 236; Sinnott-Armstrong, “Varieties of Particu-
larism,” 3–4; and Hooker, “How Reasons Are Related,” 119–20.
26. The distinction isn’t meant to be exhaustive. A consideration may also be relevant
by “intensifying” (or else “diminishing”) the favoring or counting against done by some-
thing else. To borrow an example from Dancy, suppose someone needs help when I am
the only person around. One might well think that her needing help favors helping her,
that my being the only person around doesn’t favor helping her, but that my being the
only person around makes a difference anyway by making the reason to help her—namely,
that she needs help—stronger than it would have been had there been others around.
See Dancy, Ethics without Principles, 42.
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1 not to be prevented from favoring f-ing turns 3 into part of the reason
to f only if we can draw no distinction between reasons which favor the
actions they are reasons for and conditions for something’s being a
reason which aren’t themselves parts of the reason. Holists say that
conditions such as 3, and maybe 2, are better described as conditions
whose presence is “suitable,” and whose absence would be “unsuitable,”
for 1 to be a reason to f than they are described as parts of the reason.27
Further grounds may exist for finding the distinction between rea-
sons and suitable conditions intuitive and important. It may help us to
capture general conditions for the presence of reasons. For example,
suppose that there being a normative reason for one to do something
requires that one satisfy some counterfactual motivational condition,
such as the “internalism requirement” defended by Bernard Williams
and others.28 It would seem better to treat this as a condition for a
consideration to count as a normative reason than as part of each in-
dividual reason’s content.29 The distinction may also help us to distin-
guish between different kinds of reasons. Consider, for example, insti-
tutional theories according to which considerations of distributive justice
apply only when certain kinds of social institutions exist. Such a view
might imply that when people are starving and we have resources to
feed them, but institutions for distributing food to them don’t exist, it
might be morally bad but not unjust to let them starve. We might then
treat the existence of certain institutions as part of the reasons of justice
to help the starving. But it would seem more plausible to think that
their existence is a suitable condition in whose absence no reason which
27. I deploy these notions in developing my positive account in Sec. III, but I won’t
make much of the distinction between them. The presence of an unsuitable condition is
the absence of a suitable condition by another name, or at least necessarily coincident.
(A fuller discussion would do well to investigate differences between different kinds of
suitable conditions.) Dancy invokes “enabling” and “disabling” conditions for similar the-
oretical purposes, although he also registers some concerns about his terminology. See
Dancy, Ethics without Principles, 39–40 and 92, respectively. Although nothing essential hangs
on this, I prefer the term ‘suitable’ because it is coherent to think, for example, that being
taken in by fraud is an unsuitable condition for promising to give a reason without thereby
thinking that not being taken in by deception enables promising to give a reason. (Issues
about “positive” and “negative” facts arise here, however.)
28. See Bernard Williams, “Internal and External Reasons,” in his Moral Luck (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 101–13.
29. Thanks to Stephen Darwall for pointing out to me that he has drawn a similar
conclusion from a broadly internalist condition for the presence of a reason. See Stephen
L. Darwall, Impartial Reason (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983), 118, 208. As a
condition for any normative reason, this kind of suitable condition would be global rather
than local to specific reasons. Relying on the controversial principle that ‘is a reason’
implies ‘can’ (or ‘could have’), Dancy suggests that the agent’s capacity to act is a global
suitable condition. See Dancy, Ethics without Principles, 40.
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we may have for not letting people starve is a reason of distributive
justice, but at most a reason of some other kind.
In sum, holists claim that there is an important and intuitive dis-
tinction between two ways of being normatively relevant: being a reason
and being a condition whose presence or absence is suitable or un-
suitable for something else to be a reason. The distinction between
reasons and suitable conditions is nonetheless controversial.30 Atomists
claim that it would be an error to let the distinction influence our
thinking about reasons. Remember, though, that my argument strategy
allows me simply to grant to holists the importance of the distinction
between reasons and suitable conditions. If the distinction does influ-
ence our thinking, rejecting holism is intuitively costly. The relevant
intuitions might be confused or wrong, of course. But, no matter what
our intuitions are, atomism is false if it isn’t an error to think that
considerations may, qua reasons, depend for their being the reasons
they are on the presence of suitable conditions that aren’t themselves
parts of those reasons.
C. What Is Holism Supposed to Have to Do with Particularism?
Reasons holism has nothing special to do with moral reasons, but par-
ticularism is usually presented as “a local consequence” of holism in the
moral domain.31 While the details of these arguments vary depending
on which strand in particularism is being defended, they all maintain
that holism can be used to question the existence of, or at least any
theoretical need for, moral principles. Just how holism is supposed to
have this consequence is a bit complicated, however.
Generalists and particularists agree that nothing is barely right but,
rather, is right in virtue of having some other, “right-making” properties.
When particularists deny any theoretical need for moral principles, they
have in mind substantive principles: manageable generalizations that
assert some sort of nontrivial, and arguably necessary, connection be-
tween moral features and some other features in virtue of which things
have those moral features. Substantive principles purport to articulate
which considerations count as good or bad making, right or wrong
making, and so on, and hence purport to be explanatory of the moral
status of the things they concern. For example, a substantive principle
that killing persons is wrong would identify killing a person as a feature
30. See esp. Joseph Raz, “The Trouble with Particularism (Dancy’s Version),” Mind
115 (2006): 99–120. See also Hooker, “How Reasons Are Related,” 119–20.
31. See Dancy, Ethics without Principles, 190; and Little, “Moral Generalities Revisited,”
281, 284. Particularism, like holism, may in the end turn out to be about reasons generally,
or at least not simply about moral reasons. To keep things manageable, I bracket this
complication in what follows.
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that would be explanatory of wrongness.32 More precisely, particularists
extend their negative attitude to “contributory” moral principles. Un-
derstood as a contributory principle, the principle that killing persons
is wrong identifies an act as pro tanto wrong—wrong insofar as it is a
killing—even if the act is overall right in virtue of its other features.33
Given this focus of particularism, presenting holism as support for
it might appear curious. Holism as we so far have it is the holism of the
“favoring relation” in which features of the situation stand to action (or
belief) when they are reasons for doing (or believing) it. But generalism
and particularism are about relations such as the “right-making relation”
in which features of the situation stand to an action when they make it
right. Any argument from holism to particularism should proceed from
the holism of the right-making relation. But the favoring relation and
the right-making relation would seem to be two distinct normative re-
lations. As Dancy himself notes, even if “most features which stand in
the favoring relation to an action are also right-makers,” this would do
“nothing to show that if one relation is holistic, so must the other be.”34
Like Dancy, however, I have yet to see any persuasive reason to think
that the domain of reasons for action and belief diverges from the
domain of moral metaphysics in such a way that even if the former is
holistic, the latter is nevertheless atomistic.35 So it seems that if the
reasons for doing something are variable qua reasons, then so must be
the reasons for its being right. Henceforth I use the term ‘moral reasons’
to refer not only to moral reasons for actions and attitudes but also to
right- and wrong-making reasons.
32. It is worth mentioning one type of necessary moral generalizations that don’t
qualify as substantive moral principles. The supervenience of the moral on the nonmoral
guarantees the existence of infinitely long disjunctions of all the possible nonmoral ways
the world might be in which a given item of evaluation has a given moral property, such
that each disjunct is (minimally) sufficient for instantiating that moral property. But al-
though these “supervenience functions” capture the extensions of moral concepts in all
possible worlds, the complicated sets of properties that they mention are too disjointed
and “indiscriminate” (i.e., they contain too much irrelevant information) to count as
explanatory. Since this point is already made persuasively enough in the literature, I won’t
defend it here. See Dancy, “Defending Particularism,” Metaphilosophy 30 (1999): 25–32,
26, and Ethics without Principles, 86–88; Little, “Moral Generalities Revisited,” 285–87; and
McKeever and Ridge, Principled Ethics, 7–8. I am, however, tempted to add to these ar-
guments that, understood in the standard way as a relation of necessary covariance, su-
pervenience is a purely modal nonsymmetric relation. This means that the supervenience
relation itself is already of a wrong sort to count as an explanatory relation.
33. Whether there are any true principles concerning the overall rightness or wrong-
ness of actions is a family dispute among generalists. Particularists treat W. D. Ross and
other pluralists, who defend only contributory principles and deny the existence of true
overall principles, as generalists.
34. Dancy, Ethics without Principles, 79; see also 33.
35. See ibid., 80.
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Arguments from holism to particularism turn, in different ways, on
a putative lack of fit between the kind of context dependence of reasons
that holism affirms and the kind of dependence of moral reasons on
substantial moral principles that generalism affirms. Holism would seem
to support particularism if we assumed, as particularists and generalists
alike have tended to, that generalists are committed to the atomistic
thesis that a genuine contributory principle purports to identify features
that are invariably right making and wrong making.36 Generalists who
accept this assumption have no choice but to argue against holism. The
form of generalism I wish to defend rejects precisely this assumption.
III. FROM MORAL REASONS TO MORAL PRINCIPLES
The task of the generalist, given the foregoing, is to develop an account
of moral principles which she can use to accommodate and explain
reasons holism. I begin by defending a general thesis about moral rea-
sons that I call the “basis thesis” and then argue that certain applications
of that thesis suggest an account of moral principles that supports ge-
neralism but can explain holism.
A. The Basis Thesis
It is surely no accident that some considerations but not others count
as moral reasons. Suppose I claim that the fact that Baldrick is my friend
and has a penchant for turnips is a moral reason for giving him this
magnificent turnip that I possess, despite the fact that giving it to starving
strangers would result in a greater benefit. Asking me to explain why
that fact is the kind of reason I claim it to be would be of a piece with
36. At least the following generalists accept this sort of thesis: W. D. Ross, The Right
and the Good (Oxford: Clarendon, 1930), 19, 29; R. M. Hare, Moral Thinking (Oxford:
Clarendon, 1981), 41–42; Shafer-Landau, “Moral Rules,” 586; Raz, “Truth in Particularism,”
220–30; Sinnott-Armstrong, “Varieties of Particularism,” 4; Brad Hooker, “Moral Particu-
larism: Wrong and Bad,” in Hooker and Little, Moral Particularism, 1–22, 10; Crisp, “Par-
ticularizing Particularism,” 37–40; Philip Stratton-Lake, Kant, Duty, and Moral Worth (Lon-
don: Routledge, 2000), 128–30; and Audi, The Good in the Right, 71–73. (I mention some
recent generalists who are exceptions in n. 68.) Many generalists accept the thesis because
they take moral principles to traffic in morally relevant features but overlook the distinc-
tions that holism draws among different forms of relevance. See R. M. Hare, “Relevance,”
in his Essays in Ethical Theory (Oxford: Clarendon, 1989), 191–211, 193; Raz, “Truth in
Particularism,” 230, 236; Shafer-Landau, “Moral Rules,” 586. Others draw alternative dis-
tinctions. See Audi, The Good in the Right, 72–73. Finally, some argue as if the existence
of some invariable moral reasons entailed generalism. See Shafer-Landau, “Moral Rules,”
586; Hooker, “Wrong and Bad,” 10; and Audi, The Good in the Right, 71. But particularism
allows that there may be some invariable moral reasons and that the true general prop-
ositions stating those facts count as moral principles. Even if the existence of invariable
moral reasons automatically generates corresponding principles, the occasional appear-
ance of such reasons would fail to show that moral reasons require the existence of a
comprehensive set of true moral principles. See Dancy, “Particularist’s Progress,” 136.
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the business of giving reasons. When something is (i.e., has the relational
property of being) a moral reason of a certain type, we normally think
we can explain this, and it seems integral to moral justification that we
should be unsatisfied if we cannot. If so, then when some fact is a moral
reason of a certain type, there should be something because of which
it is such a reason. Thus we seem to recognize a tripartite distinction
between a fact that is a reason of a certain type, the fact that it is a
reason of that type, and the source and explanation of its having that
kind of normative significance.
To illustrate, suppose there is a moral reason for giving the turnip
to Baldrick. (We could alternatively run the illustration in terms of right-
making reasons.) Then, first, there should be something that is the
reason. Here we are supposing that the reason is the fact, call it B, that
Baldrick is my friend and has a penchant for turnips. Second, B is to
be distinguished from the further, normative claim that B is (i.e., has
the relational property of being) a moral reason for giving the turnip
to Baldrick. Third, we may legitimately ask of this second claim why it
is true. It seems that there should be something that explains why B is
a reason to give him the turnip if I am to be entitled to hold that B is
such a reason. In particular, our explanation of why B is a moral reason
for giving the turnip to Baldrick should somehow track what I call the
“basis” of the reason: some normatively significant condition (property,
relation, or the like) in virtue of whose presence B is the kind of moral
reason it is. For unless the explanation tracks such a condition, it pro-
vides no basis for attributing the property of being a moral reason to
B and so fails to explain the normative fact that B is a moral reason for
giving the turnip to Baldrick.
If the explanatory demand for the basis of a reason is intuitively
compelling in many cases, is it not at least plausible that any moral
reason has a normative basis which explains why it is a reason? Call this
claim the “basis thesis,” or BT:
(BT) For any consideration C that is a moral reason to f, the nor-
mative fact that C is a moral reason to f requires a basis that
explains why C is a moral reason to f.
I don’t pretend that I can prove that BT holds for absolutely all moral
reasons, but then again proof is a rare good in philosophy. The intuitive
case for BT strikes me as strong enough, however, to make BT plausible.
Furthermore, BT states an explanatory demand that we routinely accept
in the case of various types of nonmoral reasons. We tend to think that
when some consideration C gives a reason to believe p, there is some
epistemically favored relation such that C’s standing in it to believing
p makes C a reason to believe p. We would seem to be epistemically
defective if we thought otherwise and yet believed p. Epistemologists
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differ over what count as the relevant epistemically favored relations,
but some candidates include probability raising, truth indication, reli-
ability, justification, and warrant. And when C provides a prudential
reason for doing something, this is because of some connection between
C and the agent’s well-being. We accept the explanatory demand also
in the case of instrumental reasons. BT is just a natural extension of
this demand from nonmoral to moral reasons.37
Atomism and holism both provide support for BT. Both hold that
nonmoral and moral reasons have a unified nature qua reasons. If the
explanatory demand in BT is legitimate in the case of nonmoral reasons,
then it should be legitimate also in the case of moral reasons, irrespective
of whether nonmoral reasons are atomistic or holistic. If anything, ho-
lism strengthens the case for BT: if something is a moral reason of a
certain type in some situations but not in others, surely there should
be an explanation of why it is a reason when it is and why it isn’t a
reason when it isn’t. Unsurprisingly, then, BT itself is perfectly com-
patible with both generalism and particularism.38 Generalists and par-
ticularists need only differ over the substantive issue of what the bases
of moral reasons are like. BT itself can be common ground that may
help to make the debate between generalists and particularists more
tractable.
BT allows that what explains why some consideration is a reason
of a certain type needn’t be distinct in various senses from the consid-
eration itself. First, BT is compatible with the possibility that what ex-
plains why a consideration is a reason of a certain type may sometimes
not be distinct from the consideration’s particular content. For example,
if the fact that something would be cruel is a reason not to do it, what
37. One might think that if the concept of a reason is conceptually primitive (Scanlon,
What We Owe, 17) or if the favoring relation is metaphysically primitive, then reasons
needn’t in general have a basis. But neither point is, by itself, an objection to BT. The
claim that a relation or a concept is primitive doesn’t show that the fact that the relation
holds or the concept applies in a particular instance has no explanation.
38. Dancy seems sympathetic to BT. That something is a moral reason of a certain
type is a particular moral truth, and Dancy grants that “every particular moral truth will
need and have an explanation” (Moral Reasons, 106). He suggests that whether a consid-
eration is a reason for doing something is tied to whether doing it would achieve something
of value, which seems like the kind of thing that could serve as the basis of a reason (Ethics
without Principles, 75). Dancy insists, however, that explanations of particular moral truths
are “stubbornly particular” and have “no need to be generalized” (Moral Reasons, 104,
106). (For a particularist criticism of Dancy on this score, see Little, “Moral Generalities
Revisited,” 299–300.) Dancy also suggests that particular moral facts might be explained
solely by the particular congeries of circumstances, at least provided our description of
the latter has the right kind of narrative structure (Moral Reasons, 112–14). The suggestion
is hard to assess because Dancy’s development of it remains hardly more than impres-
sionistic. This strikes me as generally true of the extant particularist accounts of the bases
of moral reasons.
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explains this might well be the content of the concept “cruelty.” Second,
BT is compatible with the possibility that what explains why a consid-
eration is a reason of a certain type may sometimes not be metaphysically
distinct from the consideration. For example, suppose that some true
synthetic identity claims, on the model of “Heat is molecular kinetic
energy,” are available in ethics. Perhaps the property of being cruel is
identical with some such property as inflicting pain or distress on un-
willing victims just for one’s own enjoyment. In that case the fact that
an action would inflict pain or distress on an unwilling victim just for
one’s own enjoyment would be a moral fact (that the action would be
cruel) under a nonmoral description or mode of presentation. Then
what explains why that fact is a reason against the action might well be
the particular nature of that fact. For if the predicate ‘inflicts pain or
distress on an unwilling victim just for one’s own enjoyment’ referred
to a negative moral property, then it would seem plausible that the fact
that an action would be of this kind is a reason not to do it because to
refrain from doing it would be to avoid instantiating that negative moral
property. The basis of the reason would be “built into” the reason as a
matter of synthetic metaphysical truth.39 But it can still explain why the
reason is the reason it is.40
Some people might worry that BT is vulnerable to an infinite re-
gress. They might suspect that any explanation as to why a consideration
is a reason to f will be related to a further reason for f-ing, but that,
by BT, that further reason will need an explanation, and so on ad in-
finitum. For my part, I find it unclear why the kind of explanation that
BT demands should have to proceed by way of a reason at all, since I
find it unclear why we should think of all explanations as reasons by
39. A point of clarification worth noting here is that BT is compatible with various
reductionisms about moral facts and properties. For example, suppose the fact that f-ing
would promote overall happiness is a moral reason to f. BT allows for the reductive
utilitarian explanation that this is because for there to be a moral reason to f just is for
f-ing to promote overall happiness. (This looks like an acceptable kind of explanatory
claim, but it raises some delicate issues about the role of identity statements in explanations,
which I cannot discuss here.)
40. Another point of clarification worth noting here is that BT is compatible with a
wide range of views in moral epistemology. I cannot discuss the issue fully here. But
consider forms of moral intuitionism according to which there are self-evident pro tanto
duties that are knowable via a priori reflection. See Ross, The Right and the Good, chap. 2.
If it is self-evident that some fact counts as a moral reason, then we might worry that this
truth has no explanation of the kind that BT demands. (Thanks to Terence Irwin and
Michael Ridge for raising a worry like this.) Self-evidence is, however, an epistemic property
of propositions. All it means for a proposition to be self-evident is for it to be a truth such
that, in virtue of having an adequate understanding of it, one is in a position to know it.
See Audi, The Good in the Right, 48–49. Since a proposition that can be known in this way
might be knowable in some other way as well (e.g., by testimony or explanatory inference),
the self-evidence of a proposition doesn’t show that its truth has no explanation.
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another name. But even if it did, the point that what explains why a
consideration is a reason of a certain type needn’t be distinct from the
consideration itself rescues BT from infinite regress. As that point shows,
BT doesn’t entail that any explanation as to why something is a reason
will be related to a further reason (let alone that A can explain B only
if there is an explanation as to why A explains B).
B. The Basis Argument for Generalism
My argument for generalism proceeds from the core idea of BT that
any moral reason requires a basis that explains it. This “basis argument”
runs as follows:
(G1) Any moral reason requires a normative basis that explains it.
(G2) The normative basis of any moral reason requires the existence
of a (set of) true moral principle(s).
(C1) Therefore, moral reasons depend for their existence on the
existence of a comprehensive set of moral principles.
(G3) The possibility of sound moral judgment depends on the ex-
istence of moral reasons.
(C2) Therefore, the possibility of sound moral judgment depends on
the existence of a comprehensive set of moral principles.
Again, I focus on judgments to the effect that a consideration is a moral
reason (of a certain type). G3 is acceptable here, for were it false these
judgments would be false. Since BT is compatible with particularism,
G1 by itself allows that the normative bases of moral reasons might not
have anything to do with moral principles of any kind. They might
instead have to do, as some particularists claim, just with the particular
congeries of circumstances; other options might exist as well. To defend
G2, I first present some examples that suggest an account of what the
bases of moral reasons are generally like. I then argue that the account
and examples support a novel kind of hedged moral principles that
tolerate exceptions, and that a generalization of this model of hedged
principles entails G2 but also explains why holism, if true, is true. While
I don’t pretend that I can prove that absolutely every moral reason
requires the existence of a true moral principle, the general model of
hedged principles that I offer supports G2 by providing what is to my
knowledge the best extant account of what the bases of moral reasons
are like.
Consider again “The Promise.” Given BT, something explains why
promising to do something gives a moral reason to do it. What exactly
one regards as the basis of that reason will depend on one’s substantive
moral theory. Utilitarian and contractualist theories supply familiar can-
didates: keeping a promise (i) sustains a social institution which has
cooperative and other benefits to people and (ii) gives due weight to
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the expectations that a promise creates concerning one’s future behav-
ior.41 These views agree that the reason to fulfill the promise has a basis
that is the source of the kind of normative significance that the reason
has. According to each view, promising gives a reason insofar as, and
because, fulfilling the promise would be a certain appropriate kind of
response to something of moral significance: it would (i) help sustain
a beneficial social institution or (ii) meet the expectations one has
created. So each view offers an explanation (credible or not) of why
promising gives moral reasons.
Notice that views i and ii also imply a view of what the basis of the
reason to fulfill one’s promises is like. Both give the basis a relational
structure: it is constituted by something that is (claimed to be) of moral
significance plus a certain kind of response to that thing. In the case
of any given reason, the nature of each constituent is a substantive moral
question.42 Even if we agree that promises give reasons because the
institution of promising has social utility, we may disagree about whether
we have any reason to keep a promise when by keeping it we would
allow ten promises to be broken and so would fail to promote promise
keeping. But we would agree that promising gives a reason only insofar
as keeping the promise would be an appropriate kind of response (on
whose nature we happen to disagree) to a value or ideal that we share.
Both view i and view ii allow that the reason to fulfill a promise is
variable. Suppose that Mark, by subtle emotional manipulation, gets
Hannah to promise that she won’t badmouth him no matter how he
treats her. If making such a promise gave Hannah a reason to keep it,
then those who act immorally in manipulating others could exploit the
institution of promising to create reasons (and, sometimes, obligations)
for their victims.43 This would be morally objectionable in itself and in
making regret and reparation for breaking a manipulated promise mor-
ally appropriate. More to my point, fulfilling a manipulated promise in
cases of this sort would hardly be what the promisor owes to the promisee
on the basis of the expectations that her promise created. If promising
gave a reason to fulfill the promise even when the promise was extracted
by manipulation, it would be legitimate to exploit an institution which
41. I use these views for illustration only. Option i comes from Holly Smith, “The
Paradox of Promising,” Philosophical Review 106 (1997): 153–96, 181–82. Option ii comes
from Scanlon, What We Owe, 296. The illustration would be easy to supplement with virtue-
ethical and other substantive moral theories.
42. According to one way of distinguishing consequentialism from nonconsequen-
tialism, consequentialism requires us to promote values even when doing so requires not
honoring them. See Philip Pettit, “Consequentialism,” in Blackwell Companion to Ethics, ed.
Peter Singer (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), 230–40.
43. I owe this point to David McNaughton and Piers Rawling. See McNaughton and
Rawling, “Unprincipled Ethics,” 270.
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should have social utility and benefits to people, as well as the practice
of committing oneself to expectations one has created about one’s future
conduct, for purposes that would tend to undermine the institution or
practice. So, neither view i nor view ii provides a basis why promising
should give any reason at all to fulfill the promise in certain cases of
manipulated promises. (Similar points could be made about certain prom-
ises extracted by fraud or trickery.) Each view allows that the fact that
Hannah’s promise was extracted by manipulation may be an unsuitable
condition for the promise to give Hannah a reason to fulfill it.44
We have seen that promising gives a reason for fulfilling the promise
when, and because, fulfilling it would be an appropriate kind of response
to some appropriate kind of moral ideal. But now notice likewise that
the fact that a promise was extracted by manipulation is an unsuitable
condition for promising to give a reason to fulfill the promise when,
and because, fulfilling the promise under that condition would fail to
be an appropriate kind of response to the relevant moral ideal. Thus
we can appeal to one and the same normative basis to explain the
normative fact that promising gives a reason to fulfill the promise and
the normative fact that being extracted by manipulation is an unsuitable
condition for promising to give a reason to fulfill the promise. Given
BT, this shared structure is unsurprising. Since being an unsuitable
condition is a way of being morally relevant, the kind of explanatory
demand that we find in BT extends naturally also to the question of
why some conditions but not others are unsuitable. Those of us who
find gripping the question of why something is a reason can enlist the
shared structure of reasons and unsuitable conditions to hijack holism
into a generalist framework.
C. A Model of Hedged Moral Principles
Many of us take some principle to the effect that promises ought to be
kept to be true. If the above discussion of promising is on the right
track, then the truth of the principle should tolerate certain exceptions
even when it is understood as a contributory principle to the effect that
promising to f gives the agent some moral reason to f. It should tolerate
44. I say “may” because my points here don’t require that manipulation invariably
count as an unsuitable condition for promising to give a reason. Conditions that are
unsuitable in certain cases may not be so in others due to the presence of “meta-defeaters,”
such as features in whose presence keeping a manipulated promise would be an appro-
priate response to something of moral significance after all. Perhaps, for example, coerced
promises can have some moral weight in contexts where coercion is just. See McNaughton
and Rawling, “Unprincipled Ethics,” 270. In such cases, keeping a coerced promise may
well sustain an institution that has social utility and benefits to people (or whatever one
takes as the relevant basis). Something similar might be true of cases where parents
manipulate their children to make promises by offering bribes or rewards.
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certain promises, such as certain manipulated promises, which give the
agent no moral reason at all to keep them because the conditions are
unsuitable for them to do so. The principle can tolerate these exceptions
only if it has a more complex structure than it seems on the surface to
have. For the exceptions would refute the simple universal generaliza-
tion that all promises ought pro tanto to be kept. But when ordinary
agents make moral judgments, many of them seem quite sensitive to
the possibility that what is a moral reason in one context may be neutral
in others. They also seem, to varying degrees, sensitive to the presence
or absence of unsuitable conditions. Their sensitivity to these complex-
ities in the behavior of moral reasons suggests that they already treat
commonsense moral principles as having a more complex structure than
our ordinary verbal formulations of those principles (such as “Keep
your promises”) let on.
One way to make moral principles reflect this complexity of struc-
ture would be to have them mention the (un)suitable conditions. We
could do this in one of two ways. We could either tack an “unless” clause
onto a given principle, and try to spell out the unsuitable conditions
associated with it, or else add the caveat that the conditions are suitable,
which quantifies over the suitable conditions instead of spelling them
out. Both options are problematic. One reason why the latter option is
problematic is that it gives us no idea about what conditions count as
unsuitable or how we could come to apply thus-qualified principles
reliably. One reason why the former option is problematic is that we
might not generally be able to state the unsuitable conditions associated
with a given principle in a finite and manageable form.45 It would be
better not to have to assume that we can do so. A more natural way for
generalists to accommodate BT would, in any case, be to build a ref-
erence to the bases of moral reasons into moral principles. Since neither
the caveat that the conditions are suitable nor a list of unsuitable con-
ditions makes reference to normative bases, accommodating BT requires
such a reference somewhere anyway. But then a separate reference to
(un)suitable conditions would be redundant, since we have seen that
the explanatory demand that we find in BT extends naturally to them.
A reference to normative bases alone suffices to reflect the shared struc-
ture of reasons and unsuitable conditions. This approach will pay off
with important explanatory gains.
To build a reference to the bases of moral reasons into principles,
45. See also Sec. V.B. As stated here, these objections are obviously not decisive. I
mention them primarily to motivate my own approach. I develop the objections more
fully, and argue that the list account is unsatisfactory and unnecessary, in other work. See
Pekka Va¨yrynen, “A Theory of Hedged Moral Principles” (unpublished manuscript, avail-
able at http://www.philosophy.ucdavis.edu/pekkav/research/hedged.pdf).
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I need a way of describing a given normative basis which is neutral on
the substantive question of what that basis is. Recall that the bases of
reasons seem to have a relational structure. Let “the designated relation”
for a property F and a moral property M (such as being right or being
wrong) be that relation R , whatever it is, such that x’s being F is a reason
for (or, contributes to) x’s being M when, and because, x instantiates
R .46 In general, R is a relation such as promoting or honoring some
moral ideal (value, right, etc.) that is capable of explaining the reasons
provided by F. (Sometimes R is a monadic relational property.) For
example, if we think that promising to f is a moral reason to f because
of the utility of the institution of promising and how it can be of benefit
to people, then we will regard something like “sustaining a beneficial
social institution” as the designated relation for promising and pro tanto
rightness.
Just which relation the designated relation is in the case of a given
moral reason, and whether one exists at all, are subjects of substantive
moral dispute between consequentialists of various stripes, contract and
rights theorists, virtue theorists, and others. But the following moral
principle is neutral with respect to such disputes:
(P) Necessarily, any act that one has promised to do is pro tanto right
in virtue of one’s having promised to do it, provided the act
instantiates the designated relation for promising and pro tanto
rightness.
Principle P is an instance of a kind of principle that is hedged by reference
to the designated relation. For any given choice of ‘F ’ and ‘M’, we can
speak of ‘the designated relation for F and M’. So there always seems to
be available a moral principle (be it true or false) that affirms the existence
of the designated relation for F and M and selects it as the basis of the
reason that something’s being F gives for its being M, like so:
(HP) Necessarily, any x that is F is M in virtue of x’s being F, provided
x instantiates the designated relation for F and M.47
HP sets out a general model of “hedged” moral principles.48 The case
of promising motivates this way of hedging principles and shows that it
elegantly captures the shared structure of reasons and unsuitable con-
46. Thanks to Bernard Nickel for inspiring the term ‘the designated relation’.
47. I cannot here discuss issues about how best to analyze the logical form of principles
of the form HP or the proviso they contain (e.g., whether to interpret it as an operator
on sentences or propositions, or as something else).
48. The core ideas of this account of moral principles allow for both cognitivist and
noncognitivist interpretations. They are also silent about whether the designated relations
should be understood in a moral realist way and if so, whether they are natural or non-
natural relations.
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ditions. For a given choice of ‘F ’ and ‘M ’ such that R is the designated
relation for F and M, the corresponding hedged principle entails not
only that x’s being F counts as a moral reason for x’s being M when,
and because, x instantiates R but also that conditions are unsuitable for
x’s being F to contribute to x’s being M when, and because, x fails to
instantiate R .49
Hedged principles count as substantive moral principles, since they
purport to identify features in virtue of which things have their moral
properties. They may be either contributory or overall principles, de-
pending on whether the predicate ‘M’ is used to ascribe pro tanto or
overall moral status. In either case they purport to identify reasons that
are “contextually unanimous” but not thereby exceptionless. A moral
reason is contextually unanimous if it must have the same polarity when-
ever it falls into the principle’s domain of applicability.50 The domains
of hedged principles are the extensions of their designated relations.
So when the designated relation exists for a given choice of ‘F ’ and
‘M ’, something’s being F must provide a reason for its being M whenever
it instantiates the designated relation (hence the ‘necessarily’ in HP).
What follows from a given hedged principle is not that the connection
between the relevant F and M is exceptionless (although it might be),
but only that it is invariant under a certain range of hypothetical changes
that is determined by reference to the relevant designated relation.51
This model of moral principles explains holism: a feature that a
49. Since the designated relations invoke moral properties, my proposal has certain
affinities with David McNaughton and Piers Rawling’s proposal that “non-moral features
can enter weak moral principles, but only with evaluative riders attached,” so that there
are moral principles “with implicit conditions” that “spell out complex evaluative features
that always (morally) count one way” (McNaughton and Rawling, “Unprincipled Ethics,”
268, 271). I am sympathetic to much of their view and have followed their discussion of
promising on certain key points (see nn. 43 and 44). I cannot here fully spell out how
my proposal differs from theirs, but interested readers can easily confirm that their pro-
posal carries certain commitments that my structural proposal avoids regarding such ques-
tions as what the relevant “evaluative riders” are like and whether “thick” evaluative features
have invariable valence (see n. 62).
50. I borrow the label ‘contextual unanimity’ from John Dupre´, who so dubs a struc-
turally similar requirement of probabilistic causality. See John Dupre´, “Probabilistic Cau-
sality Emancipated,” in Causation and Causal Theories, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, ed.
Peter French, Theodore Uehling, and Howard Wettstein, vol. 9 (Minneapolis: University
of Minnesota Press, 1984), 169–75.
51. The clause ‘provided x instantiates the designated relation for F and M’ serves a
function similar to a ceteris paribus clause, but more informatively so (I hope). The clause
doesn’t generally introduce a further principle, let alone an exceptionless one. Mark Lance
and Margaret Little have independently developed an account of “defeasible moral gen-
eralizations” that have a similar structure but determine the range of hypothetical changes
under which the connection between the given F and M is invariant by reference to
“privileged conditions” instead. See Lance and Little, “Defending Moral Particularism.”
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hedged principle identifies as giving moral reasons of a certain type
may fail in some contexts to give a reason of that type, and this happens
when, and because, the relevant designated relation fails to be instan-
tiated.52 But the model captures generalism: the normative basis of any
moral reason requires the existence of a true moral principle. For if we
generalize from the preceding discussion, then the normative basis of
any given moral reason is the relevant designated relation, (the existence
of) which entails a (true) principle of the form HP. The model also
answers to the kind of explanatory demand that we find in BT in the
case of both moral reasons and unsuitable conditions: hedged principles
not merely help specify which considerations count as reasons and un-
suitable conditions but also explain, by appeal to whether the relevant
designated relations are instantiated, why those things that count as
reasons and unsuitable conditions are morally relevant in the ways that
they are.
Our task was to support premise G2 in the basis argument for
generalism. If moral reasons flow from principles in the way outlined
above, then the model of moral principles set out in HP gives us G2.53
For it will entail that moral reasons depend on the existence of a com-
prehensive set of true hedged principles, owing to their having nor-
mative bases of the kind to which hedged principles refer. Since hedged
principles also explain holism, the result is a moderate form of moral
generalism. Those of us who wish to accommodate holism, but think
that there is something more systematic to be said about moral reasons
than particularists allow, should welcome this result.
IV. IN DEFENSE OF MODERATE GENERALISM
The model of hedged principles set out above supports generalism to
the extent that moral reasons depend on the existence of true hedged
moral principles. This generalist claim has three separable elements,
each of which needs defense. The first is the “coverage claim” that for
any moral reason there is a (set of) hedged principle(s) that (directly
52. Since principles of the form HP are silent about what happens when their proviso
fails, they also allow for the possibility that reasons may reverse their polarity, providing
opposite reasons. For if a feature that sometimes provides one type of reason ever provides
an opposite type of reason, the latter reason may well be explicable by its instantiating
some other designated relation. Principles of the form HP also allow for the possibility
that one and the same feature may function both as a reason for and as a reason against
in the same case. See Dancy, Moral Reasons, 62. For there is no structural reason why a
feature couldn’t instantiate more than one designated relation in the same case.
53. Not all moral reasons need directly fit this model. If they did, we might have a
complex hierarchy of hedged principles. But there needn’t be a distinct hedged principle
for each feature that is capable of providing moral reasons. It might be that only some
moral reasons are identified as such by moral principles and the rest depend on the ones
that are so identified. G2 allows for this possibility.
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or indirectly) identifies the consideration in question as a moral reason
of the relevant type.54 The second is the “truth claim” that for any moral
reason for which the coverage claim holds, the principles in question
are true. The third is the “dependence claim” that for any moral reason
for which the truth claim holds, the reason (or at least its having a
normative basis) depends on the existence of the principles in question.
The coverage, truth, and dependence claims all need defense be-
cause one may object to each. Against the coverage claim, one might
argue that hedged principles aren’t available to cover every moral rea-
son. Against the truth claim, one might argue that even if hedged prin-
ciples are available to cover any reason, any set of principles which covers
all moral reasons contains some that are false. Against the dependence
claim, one might argue that even if that isn’t so, moral reasons don’t
depend on the existence of the principles in question. (This last ob-
jection most closely reflects our definition of particularism.) I begin by
responding to objections to the coverage and truth claims. I then defend
the dependence claim indirectly by using hedged principles to defeat
three arguments from holism to particularism.55
A. The Coverage Claim
Do all moral reasons fit the model of hedged moral principles on offer?
While I don’t pretend that I can prove the coverage claim, I think it is
credible. But so far I have shown only that it applies to moral reasons
generated by promises. One might worry that the voluntary nature of
those reasons makes them a special case that doesn’t generalize. To
address this worry, let me present further instances of the coverage claim
which illustrate a general reason for accepting that claim.
To take a hard case for the coverage claim, consider an immigrant
single mother who works for you and is selecting a school for her gifted
son.56 Suppose that her English isn’t good enough for her to find out,
on her own, enough about the available options to make a well-informed
decision for her son but that you are in a position to help her. And
suppose that the son’s best interests give you a reason to help her. There
are various courses of action for which the fact that they would promote
the son’s interests might be thought to give no reason. For example,
54. The indirect case would be those moral reasons that depend on other moral
reasons which moral principles identify as such.
55. In other work, I defend the dependence claim directly by arguing that hedged
principles play a robust explanatory role with respect to why things have the moral prop-
erties they do, why the features they identify as providing moral reasons do so (when they
do), and why the unsuitable conditions are unsuitable. See Va¨yrynen, “Hedged Principles.”
56. I am reasonably sure that I have encountered the sort of case I am about to
describe somewhere, but unfortunately I have been unable to relocate the source. My
thanks and apologies to whoever it was.
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marching to the principal’s office in the school that best suits the son
and signing him up for next fall would be intrusive and condescending
to the mother. Given that she is her son’s guardian, these conditions
might be unsuitable for the son’s interests to give you a reason to enroll
him in the school in these ways. Conditions that are suitable for the
son’s interests to give you a reason for certain courses of action would
seem to include conditions such as that the ways you assist the mother
support her confidence in and respect for herself. You might supply
her with information about different schools, scholarship options, and
the like, help her to process and start acting upon the information,
serve as an interpreter with school officials, and so on.
We might wonder how general principles could capture these kinds
of complexities in the particular situations we face in our moral lives. But
candidates for the basis of the reasons which the son’s interests give you
for acting in these ways do suggest themselves. One such candidate would
be the relation of respecting the dignity of persons. If certain ways of
assisting would help enhance the son’s rational capacities while also sup-
porting the mother’s autonomy and self-respect, whereas other ways would
ill befit the mother’s dignity as a person, dignity would seem to be the
sort of thing that is capable of answering to the explanatory demand in
BT.57 Respecting the dignity of persons is then a candidate for the des-
ignated relation for assisting people’s interests and pro tanto rightness.
Thus a hedged principle to the effect that assisting people’s interests is
pro tanto right, be it true or false, is available for consideration.
We find the similar structure in many other cases. Consider Hume’s
discussion of “circumstances of justice,” which rests the applicability of
principles of justice on the mutual acceptance of a general system of
rules and laws which is mutually advantageous.58 To explain why the
circumstances of justice are morally relevant, we presumably must invoke
some basis in virtue of which the absence of those circumstances is an
unsuitable condition for principles of justice to apply. The dominant
strand in the contractualist tradition, for example, takes promoting in-
57. It is tangential to my present point if this candidate is too simplistic fully to account
for the case. A fuller discussion might do greater justice to the complexities of moral life
by, among other things, illustrating ways in which various moral ideals that can figure in
the normative bases of moral reasons may interact. One discussion that may be usefully
read in this light is Philippa Foot’s discussion of how justice and friendship affect the
demands of benevolence. See Philippa Foot, “Utilitarianism and the Virtues,” Mind 94
(1985): 196–209.
58. See David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, 2nd ed., ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge, rev.
P. H. Nidditch (1739–40; Oxford: Clarendon, 1978), III.ii.2, and An Enquiry Concerning the
Principles of Morals, ed. Tom L. Beauchamp (1751; New York: Oxford University Press,
1998), sec. 3 and app. 3. See also John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1971), 126–30.
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dividual or mutual advantage as such a basis. So hedged principles of
justice are available for consideration. Or consider principles whose
applicability depends on contingent physical and biological facts about
humans, such as that we are vulnerable to bodily attack. As H. L. A.
Hart points out, we could have acquired the sort of physical structure
that makes exoskeletons virtually immune from attack by other members
of their species.59 Were we invulnerable to bodily attack, there would
be no basis why the fact that an act would constitute a bodily attack on
another human being should be a moral reason against it. Under such
circumstances, attacking people wouldn’t be among the things that in-
fringe their right to life or bodily integrity, violate their autonomy, and
so on. These are among the candidates for the designated relation to
which a hedged principle against attacking others would refer.
These examples suggest a general reason for accepting the coverage
claim. Normative ethicists’ accounts of rightness and wrongness appeal
to ideals such as well-being, justice, the virtues, or the rights of persons
or their dignity or capacity to lead self-governed meaningful lives and
designate certain responses, such as promoting or honoring, as appro-
priate to these ideals. To pick an example more or less at random, when
we wonder why promoting well-being matters, we might conclude that
it matters because persons merit concern and respect and promoting
well-being is one way of enacting concern for persons.60 Or we might
conclude that it matters because it promotes intrinsically good states of
affairs. Either way, hedged principles concerning the promotion of well-
being are available. But now notice that combining any ideal with any
way of responding to one generates a relation that has the structure of
the kind of relations that I call the designated relations. If normative
ethicists’ tools already include the constituent elements of such rela-
tions, then hedged moral principles fit well with the way that normative
ethicists argue about moral questions. We can then reasonably suppose
that a set of hedged principles will be available to cover every moral
reason.61
Atomist generalists might worry that hedged principles are a bad
fit for them because my examples are largely cast as involving variable
reasons. But they needn’t worry. Moderate generalism that appeals to
hedged principles holds that all moral reasons have a certain kind of
basis, not that they are all variable qua reasons. A principle of the form
HP can be true even if the instances of the relevant F invariably instan-
59. See H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford: Clarendon, 1961), 190.
60. See Christian Coons, “What Makes States of Affairs Good” (unpublished manu-
script, University of California, Davis).
61. Also recall, from n. 8, that the hybrid view that only some moral reasons require
the existence of moral principles is dialectically ill-motivated.
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tiate the relevant designated relation. For any such F, the conditions
will always be suitable for F to provide a reason for M. This possibility
remains open because the content of hedged principles involves no
reference to suitable conditions or the possibility of their failure to
obtain. Whether a given principle identifies a variable reason depends
on the nature of the relevant designated relation.
Many atomist generalists also have positive reason to welcome my
account. An example would be the view that such “thick” moral facts
as that an act is just or kind must always be reasons for doing it and
that an act is unjust or cruel must always be reasons against doing it,
and the periphery of variable reasons depends on the invariable core
constituted by such reasons.62 Such a view retains a theoretical need for
principles that are capable of covering variable reasons. For a set of
principles that identifies justice, courage, generosity, and so on, as nec-
essarily right making, and cruelty, cowardice, greed, and so on, as nec-
essarily wrong making, would be incomplete. As the atomist admits, not
all reasons are like that; some are variable. Examples might be the
reasons that make actions cowardly, kind, and so on. These atomists
have reason to welcome an account that can supplement principles that
affirm substantive connections between the virtues and rightness with
principles that identify features in virtue of which actions exhibit par-
ticular virtues.
B. The Truth Claim
Even if we have seen some hedged principles that are plausibly true,
why think that the truth claim should hold in full generality? One worry
observes that ‘the designated relation’ is a definite description. The
standard (“Russellian”) semantics of sentences in which definite de-
scriptions occur imply that a principle of the form HP is true only if
there exists a unique designated relation (a unique relation R such that
62. Roger Crisp expresses such a view in terms of the virtues. See Crisp, “Particular-
izing Particularism,” 39–40. David McNaughton and Piers Rawling express such a view in
terms of thick evaluative features that provide invariable “primary reasons.” See McNaugh-
ton and Rawling, “Unprincipled Ethics,” 257–59, 273. Hedged principles are compatible
with such views but don’t require them. Hence I can set certain vexed issues about virtues
and thick evaluative features to one side. One such issue is whether some thick features
have variable valence. Some holists argue that an unjust response might be just what is
called for in certain circumstances, such as situations apt to arise in ordinary family life.
See Christine Swanton, “A Virtue Ethical Account of Right Action,” Ethics 112 (2001):
32–52, 48. See also Dancy, Ethics without Principles, 84, 121–22. (For my own part, I am not
convinced that in such a situation an unjust act is called for qua unjust, rather than that
it is favored qua just but stronger opposing reasons favor an unjust act.) Another such
issue is whether the virtues or thick evaluative features themselves constitute moral reasons
(e.g., whether the fact that an act would be generous is a reason to do it), or whether it
is the “virtue-making” features that do so.
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x’s being F is a reason for x’s being M when, and because, x instantiates
R). We can now imagine a two-premise objection. For a given choice
of ‘F ’ and ‘M’, even if instances of F give reasons for their bearers’
being M in virtue of instantiating a designated relation for F and M
such as I have described, there is no good reason to suppose that the
relation must be the same whenever an instance of F gives a reason for
its bearer’s being M. But, if no unique designated relation for F and M
exists, then the corresponding hedged principle is at best false. There-
fore, there is no good reason to suppose that a comprehensive set of
true hedged principles exists.
One response to this “nonuniqueness objection,” as we might call
it, is to drop the uniqueness clause from our semantics of definite de-
scriptions.63 Then a hedged principle can be true even if it doesn’t
denote a unique designated relation. Another response is to point out
that a semantics of definite descriptions that includes a uniqueness
clause can plausibly imply only that the truth of a principle of the form
HP requires nothing more than the existence of a unique designated
relation within some restricted class of relations. This is because Rus-
sellians will in any case have to restrict the interpretation of definite
descriptions in some fashion to avoid counterexamples. Since the re-
sulting uniqueness conditions are likely to be weak and highly nuanced,
it is simply unclear why hedged principles cannot succeed in picking
out relevantly unique designated relations.64
These responses might not, however, fully address the worry mo-
tivating the first premise of the nonuniqueness objection. Consider
moral claims of the form 6:
(6) The fact that o is F is a reason for o’s being M.
Whatever our semantics of descriptions, a claim of the form 6 might
hold in some cases because o instantiates relation R1, in other cases
because o instantiates relation R2, and so on. To illustrate, one might
think that killing a person is a wrong-making reason sometimes because
it frustrates the victim’s prudential interests, sometimes because it de-
stroys the kind of intrinsic good that the individual person is, and some-
63. For one recent case against uniqueness, see Zolta´n Gendler Szabo´, “Descriptions
and Uniqueness,” Philosophical Studies 101 (2000): 29–57, and “The Loss of Uniqueness,”
Mind 114 (2005): 1185–1222.
64. To see just how careful we have to be in explicating the relevant uniqueness
conditions, consider sentences like the following: “If someone buys a sage plant here, she
always buys eight others along with it” (uttered at a plant store, and where “it” p “the
unique sage plant that each person bought”), and “If a bishop meets another bishop, the
bishop blesses the other bishop.” See Irene Heim, “E-Type Pronouns and Donkey Anaph-
ora,” Linguistics and Philosophy 13 (1990): 137–78. Thanks to Michael Glanzberg for re-
ferring me to these examples.
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times because it violates her dignity. Whether the truth of a hedged
principle requires the existence of a unique designated relation or not,
one might think that the spirit of generalism would be under threat if
hedged principles assigned to moral reasons normative bases that are
normatively disjoint in this kind of way. Moderate generalism might in
that case seem to be no more than particularism in disguise.
Moderate generalists have at least two possible replies to this worry.
To illustrate, suppose that our moral concern for killing involves concern
not to frustrate people’s prudential interests, destroy the kind of intrinsic
goods that persons are, or violate their dignity. The first reply grants
the controversial claim that the basis for the wrong-making force of
killing in a particular instance is itself fundamentally context dependent
in the way suggested by the above motivation for the nonuniqueness
objection.65 Thus, killing might be a wrong-making reason sometimes
because it would frustrate the victim’s prudential interests, but some-
times because it would violate her dignity. But, this first reply maintains,
these two designated relations for killing and wrongness generate two
distinct principles of the form HP, each of which identifies killing as a
feature in virtue of which actions can be wrong. Both could be true.
But the resulting proliferation of principles would be unobjectionable,
since the two principles would reflect distinct moral concerns about
killing and have distinct application conditions.66 The second reply de-
nies what the first one grants. It maintains, instead, that at most one of
these principles could be true. The basis for the wrong-making force
of killing is the same whenever killing is wrong making, and any other
moral concern is relevant in some way other than by making killing a
wrong-making feature. For example, we might say that when killing a
person is wrong making that is because it violates her dignity, but that
when killing her also frustrates her prudential interests, this intensifies
the reason.67
More surely needs to be said to develop these replies. But already
as they stand, they suggest that moderate generalists who appeal to
65. I don’t find this claim compelling myself. I only maintain that moderate generalists
can go quite a way toward accommodating it.
66. Were the two principles both true and applicable in a given case, they would
overdetermine the relevant instance of 6.
67. Obviously each of these replies could also exploit such phenomena as contextual
restriction and context shift to argue that the context in which a sentence expressing a
hedged principle is uttered typically establishes a unique contextually salient designated
relation as the focus of moral concern. (This option is open irrespective of whether we
think that uniqueness is a truth-conditional feature of sentences in which definite de-
scriptions occur or something that their utterances typically generate by pragmatic pre-
supposition or implicature.) For reasons of space, I have to leave it as an exercise for the
interested readers to work out examples and figure out how the two replies would analyze
those examples.
Va¨yrynen Moral Generalism 735
hedged principles can avoid assigning normatively disjoint bases to
moral reasons. They can address the worries that motivate the non-
uniqueness objection to the truth claim. Positive arguments for the truth
claim, short of actually specifying a comprehensive set of true moral
principles, are likely to come from arguments for the dependence claim.
V. DEFEATING ARGUMENTS FROM HOLISM TO
PARTICULARISM
In presenting particularism as a local consequence of holism in the
moral domain, particularists assume that holism offers an especially
powerful way of defending their view. I finish by arguing that moderate
generalists who appeal to hedged principles can defeat three arguments
from holism to particularism. If the case to come is successful, it con-
stitutes an important indirect argument against particularism. It will also
constitute an indirect defense of the dependence claim that moral rea-
sons depend on the existence of a comprehensive set of true moral
principles.
A. The Incompatibility Argument
The most familiar argument from holism to particularism is the “in-
compatibility argument.” It says that reasons holism is true and that if
holism is true, then generalism is false (i.e., the two are incompatible),
and so generalism is false. Until recently, discussions of particularism
tended to focus on the first premise and neglect the second.68 Partic-
ularists tended to focus on developing holism and take its incompati-
bility with generalism for granted. But the second premise is false. Since
hedged principles can explain holism but give us generalism, holism is
silent about whether moral reasons depend on the existence of true
moral principles.
I am not the only one to square holism and generalism. But in a
family dispute I would argue that the appeal to hedged principles gives
moderate generalism explanatory advantages over other forms of ge-
neralism. Consider, for example, the following kind of principle from
Brad Hooker:
68. Other recent writers have independently challenged the incompatibility premise.
For a particularly crisp statement of the challenge, see McKeever and Ridge, “What Does
Holism Have.” I challenge the premise also in Pekka Va¨yrynen, “Particularism and Default
Reasons,” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 7 (2004): 53–79. (My current presentation of
moderate generalism amends and supersedes the sketch given in that article.) Frank
Jackson, Philip Pettit, and Michael Smith suggest that holism is compatible with a form
of “expected value utilitarianism.” See Jackson, Pettit, and Smith, “Ethical Particularism
and Patterns,” 97–99. For a similar point, see Holton, “Principles and Particularisms,” 197
n. 12. Responding to the challenge is one of the main aims of Dancy’s Ethics without
Principles.
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(7) That an act would constitute lying is a moral consideration against
doing it (except perhaps when there is a mutual agreement to
try to deceive one another, as in games of bluff).69
Hooker doesn’t appear to notice that principles like 7 presuppose ho-
lism. They do, though, since principle 7 makes reference to contextual
factors whose presence is said to constitute unsuitable conditions. But,
of course, to presuppose holism isn’t yet to explain it. By contrast,
hedged principles don’t presuppose holism but nonetheless explain it.
Moreover, the mere truth of a principle like 7 wouldn’t yet explain why
certain conditions but not others fall into the list of exceptions.70 By
contrast, the reference that hedged principles make to the designated
relations enables them to explain why certain conditions but not others
count as unsuitable. Finally, even if there were true principles like 7
which cover all moral reasons, this wouldn’t yet show that all moral
reasons depend on them. If the appeal to hedged principles supports
the dependence claim, that is certainly an advantage.
B. The Indefiniteness Argument
If the incompatibility argument fails, particularists are entitled to claim
at most that holism supports particularism indirectly. According to the
“indefiniteness argument,” holism raises the epistemic possibility that
we cannot state the conditions for the presence of reasons in finite and
useful terms, which raises the worry that holism-tolerating generalism
cannot deliver sufficiently definite general truths of the kind it requires
concerning moral reasons and unsuitable conditions.
This argument should worry a view like Hooker’s. Capturing the
contextual factors that generate exceptions by listing them works only
if the list of potential exception types is manageably short. For moral
principles should be capable of functioning as objects of moral cogni-
tion, and only manageably complex generalizations can do so. But at-
tempting exhaustively to list the exception types to moral principles
seems like an unpromising general strategy, for reasons that are familiar
from debates about ceteris paribus and other nonstrict generalizations
outside ethics.
One possible reply is to transform principles like 7 into claims of
the form 8:
69. See Brad Hooker, “Intuitions and Moral Theorizing,” in Ethical Intuitionism: Re-
evaluations, ed. Philip Stratton-Lake (Oxford: Clarendon, 2002), 161–83, 178; see also 176.
70. I would make a similar point about the examples that Sean McKeever and Michael
Ridge give of holistic utilitarian and Kantian principles and about Richard Holton’s That’s
It principles. See McKeever and Ridge, “What Does Holism Have,” and Holton, “Principles
and Particularisms.”
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(8) That an act would be F is a reason for its being M, unless some
feature of the situation prevents F from providing such a reason.
Claims of this form don’t presuppose that the potential unsuitable con-
ditions form a manageably short list. The problem with such claims is
that they merely quantify over the features of situations whose presence
would constitute unsuitable conditions. We can reasonably ask whether
any fairly definite and informative general account is available of what
count as potentially unsuitable conditions and what it is for them to
count as unsuitable in a particular context.71 The explanatory demand
that we find in BT would seem to call for such an account. But claims
of the form 8 seem not to supply one.
My own response to the indefiniteness argument is that it is invalid.
Moderate generalists can grant that, given holism, we might be unable
to state the potential unsuitable conditions in a manageable list. But
the argument’s conclusion doesn’t follow. Moderate generalism yields
fairly definite general truths about what conditions count as unsuitable
with respect to the right-making features. Principles of the form HP
imply that a feature of a situation is unsuitable for x’s being F to be a
reason for x’s being M when, and because, x fails to instantiate the
designated relation for F and M. This is a general condition on features
of situations, the satisfaction of which makes the presence of the feature
an unsuitable condition, but which doesn’t presuppose that the poten-
tial unsuitable conditions themselves form a manageably short list. Yet
whenever the designated relation for a given choice of ‘F ’ and ‘M’ exists,
there is (ordinary indeterminacy aside) a definite truth as to whether
conditions are unsuitable in a particular situation.72
Although I regard this response to the indefiniteness argument as
satisfactory, it raises a number of complications that go beyond the scope
71. Dancy raises the worry whether generalists can give a definite and informative
account of what it is for a feature to function as a reason in a particular context. See
Dancy, “Defending Particularism,” 27. The worry described in the text can be developed
fairly naturally into Dancy’s worry.
72. A different reply is that the indefiniteness argument begs the question. The
thought is that the argument assumes that the conditions for the presence of reasons
cannot be “codified” in finite and useful nonmoral terms, but the claim that the kind of
context dependence of moral reasons that holism asserts cannot be so codified just is a
form of particularism. See Jackson, Pettit, and Smith, “Ethical Particularism and Patterns”;
and McKeever and Ridge, “What Does Holism Have.” To be sure, if uncodifiability entails
particularism (I register some doubts about this in n. 74), and if the indefiniteness ar-
gument presupposes uncodifiability, then the argument begs the question against gener-
alism. But the argument presupposes not uncodifiability itself but only its epistemic pos-
sibility. This is enough to give the argument some weight. For holism-tolerating generalists
grant that holism raises the epistemic possibility that the number of potential unsuitable
conditions is unmanageably large. Hence they can find no ground in holism for arguing
that the number of potential unsuitable conditions is manageable.
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of this article. For example, hedged principles seem to imply that a
reliable ability to judge that a given feature of a situation counts as
unsuitable requires at least some grasp of the relevant designated re-
lation plus sensitivity and judgment. We know that relying on moral
principles requires sensitivity and judgment anyway, but generalists need
an epistemology of moral judgment to vindicate the point. My own
approach would be to explicate how even a partial grasp of the moral
ideals that figure in the relevant designated relations can contribute to
a reliable ability to detect the presence of moral reasons and potential
unsuitable conditions. What would this require, however? Must we, for
example, be able to state the designated relations exclusively in man-
ageable nonnormative terms? Especially if not, how might we come to
grasp those relations and understand and apply hedged principles?
These are important questions, but unfortunately I cannot address them
here.73 Suffice it to say that although hedged principles are compatible
with the possibility that their application conditions can be stated ex-
clusively in manageable nonnormative terms, I would deny that gener-
alism rests on this possibility. The latter requires certain assumptions
concerning the conceptual resources available to us which generalism,
as I understand it, doesn’t. Generalism is primarily a doctrine in moral
metaphysics, not a doctrine concerning our conceptual resources.74
Thus the generalist’s account of how we might come to understand and
apply moral principles can reasonably require that we have some grasp
of some moral concepts and ideals to begin with.
C. The Cosmic Accident Argument
The “cosmic accident argument” for particularism contends that, given
holism, it would be a cosmic accident if truths about how moral reasons
73. I attempt to address these questions in other work. See Va¨yrynen, “Hedged Prin-
ciples,” and “Usable Moral Principles.”
74. This point inclines me to reject the assumption, mentioned in n. 72, that un-
codifiability entails particularism. I say “inclines” because I have yet to see a clear statement
of what would count as a codification of morality. Discussions of the issue tend to jumble
the idea of stating the application conditions for moral predicates exclusively in finite and
helpful nonmoral terms with the idea of representing moral properties themselves in such
terms, shift between talking about moral terms and talking about normative terms gen-
erally, and use the expression ‘nonmoral terms’ interchangeably with ‘naturalistic terms’
and ‘descriptive terms’. See John McDowell, Meaning, Value, and Reality (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1998), 57–58, 201–2; and esp. Little, “Moral Generalities Revis-
ited,” 279–86, esp. 280. These many notions of codification aren’t equivalent. But which-
ever we select as the relevant one, the claim that morality is codifiable seems to presuppose
the availability of conceptual resources for expressing moral properties or the application
conditions for moral concepts exclusively in finite and helpful nonmoral terms. Since
generalism doesn’t, by itself, presuppose their availability, it appears not to require the
codifiability of morality.
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behave could be captured in a set of holistic principles, and so apart
from atomism there is no need for moral principles. Dancy states the
argument in the form of a challenge:
Given the holism of reasons, it would be a sort of cosmic accident
if it were to turn out that [any workable moral scheme] could be
captured in a set of holistic contributory principles. . . . It would
be an accident because, given the holism of reasons, there is no
discernible need for a complete set of reasons to be like this. If
our (or any other) morality turned out to be that way, there could
be no possible explanation of that fact. It would be pure serendipity.
. . . This claim is a challenge to the opposition to come up with
a picture of moral thought and judgment which, though it respects
the truth of reasons-holism, still requires (rather than merely makes
possible) a provision of principles that cover the ground.75
I take Dancy’s central claim to be that, were the participants in a
set of moral practices to discover that there is no set of true holistic
principles that covers all moral reasons, this would have no effect on
their practices. This claim isn’t quite to the point, however, since the
metaphysical strand in particularism is better taken to concern what
sound moral judgment requires. If the appeal to hedged principles can
be shown to generate a picture of sound moral judgment that meets
the relevant aspect of Dancy’s challenge, it undermines the cosmic ac-
cident argument and indeed gives some support to the generalist’s de-
pendence claim.
I can perhaps best make my case through an example. Suppose,
for argument’s sake, that “luck egalitarians” are right to hold that some
people’s being worse off than others is a reason to privilege them in
the distribution of benefits, but only insofar as those at the bottom are
worse off through no fault or choice of their own. Some would hold
that people’s being worse off through some fault or choice of their own
is an unsuitable condition for the fact that they are worse off to be a
(noninstrumental) reason for reducing inequality, rather than that it
merely outweighs the reason that their being worse off gives for reducing
the inequality. For luck egalitarians hold that when the worse-off are
worse off through their own fault or choice, their unequal position
relative to others is deserved and in that respect unobjectionable. They
“care about undeserved, nonvoluntary, inequalities, which they regard as
75. Dancy, Ethics without Principles, 82. In a similar vein, Margaret Little claims that
holism shows not that “moral principles . . . capable of codifying the moral landscape
. . . are impossible, but that we have no reason to expect any: any we might come across
would be, as it were, serendipitous” (Little, “Moral Generalities Revisited,” 277).
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bad, or objectionable, because unfair.”76 In the language of BT, this is
to say that (noninstrumental) reasons for reducing inequality have their
normative basis in the relation of promoting comparative fairness. A
luck egalitarian principle of the form HP is then available.
If the hedged luck egalitarian principle were false, then something
that luck egalitarians regard as a precondition of sound moral judgment
on matters of equality would fail to obtain. The conditions under which
luck egalitarians think we have (noninstrumental) moral reason to re-
duce inequality indicate that, in their view, such reasons have a nor-
mative basis that explains why some people’s being worse off than others
is a reason to reduce inequality, when it is such a reason, or else why
conditions are unsuitable for it to be such a reason. If there were no
designated relation whose instantiation explains why the fact in question
is a reason to reduce inequality, then this fact wouldn’t be a reason to
reduce inequality even when some people are worse off than others
through no fault or choice of their own. What explains why the fact
that some people are worse off than others functions here as a (non-
instrumental) reason for reducing inequality is the instantiation of the
relevant designated relation here, and not how that fact functions else-
where. Nevertheless, the hedged luck egalitarian principle entails that
that fact is the reason it is only if it also is a reason for reducing inequality
under a certain range of circumstances (roughly, whenever reducing
inequality would promote comparative fairness), and in that indirect
way its status as a reason here depends on how it functions elsewhere.77
Thus, if there are (noninstrumental) reasons for reducing inequality
and they have the kind of normative basis that luck egalitarians think
they do, then there are truths about how those reasons behave that
require the existence of a true hedged principle.
We can now see how moderate generalism confutes the allegation
of cosmic accident. The case of luck egalitarianism illustrates the mod-
erate generalist account of the existence and behavior of moral reasons.
My earlier discussion indicates how the illustration generalizes. The
resulting account respects reasons holism, as Dancy’s challenge requests,
but provides a picture of why sound moral judgment, which requires
the existence of moral reasons, should require the existence of a com-
prehensive set of true hedged moral principles. Notice that when such
a set of moral principles does exist, the outward appearances of the
relevant practices of moral judgment could be more or less what the
particularist takes them to be. Yet moderate generalism offers a picture
76. Larry Temkin, “Equality, Priority, and the Levelling Down Objection,” in The Ideal
of Equality, ed. Matthew Clayton and Andrew Williams (New York: St. Martin’s, 2000),
126–61, 129.
77. Here I mean to contrast my view with Dancy, Ethics without Principles, 78.
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of sound moral judgment which supports the dependence claim and,
in indicating why the moral domain should have a generalist structure,
meets the relevant aspects of Dancy’s challenge of cosmic accident.
If the incompatibility, indefiniteness, and cosmic accident argu-
ments for particularism all fail against moderate generalism, then it is
false advertising to present particularism as a consequence of holism in
the moral domain. The onus looks to be on particularists to develop
other arguments for their view and against generalism.
VI. CONCLUSION
I have argued that we can appeal to a novel kind of hedged moral
principles to provide a generalist account of moral reasons that can
explain reasons holism and thereby undercut much of the motivation
for particularism. Neither my model of hedged principles nor the sup-
port it provides for moderate generalism depends on whether I have
managed to state true moral principles in the course of my discussion.
While many of the hedged principles I have used as illustrations are
plausibly true, what matters is whether a comprehensive set of true moral
principles exists. Just what that set of principles might be is a question
for substantive moral theory which my structural account leaves open.
But insofar as I have managed to defend the idea that there is one, I
can conclude with the generalist claim that sound moral judgment de-
pends, due to its dependence on the existence of moral reasons, on
the existence of a comprehensive set of true moral principles.
I find moderate generalism attractive not only because its appeal
to hedged principles has considerable explanatory payoffs (only some
of which I have extracted here) but also because that appeal fits with
the practice of normative ethicists. Their project is not merely to specify
right- and wrong-making features, good- and bad-making features, and
so on, but also to figure out what is fundamentally right or wrong, or
good or bad, about things having those features. I have in effect sug-
gested that we treat the latter as the attempt to identify the normative
bases of right- and wrong-making reasons (etc.) and that a certain at-
tractive account of what those bases are like helps to vindicate the gen-
eralist conception of moral theory as the project of stating and defend-
ing principles concerning the rightness and wrongness of actions and
other general moral principles. We should feel free to prefer moral
generalism over particularism, provided we have the forbearance to
enjoy it in the kind of moderation I have recommended.
